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WALKING ON EGGSHELLS IN THE 
WORKPLACE: DENYING WORKERS’ 
COMPENSATION LIABILITY USING THE 
EMPLOYEE KNOWLEDGE STANDARD IN 
RAMIREZ-TRUJILLO v. QUALITY EGG, L.L.C. 
CHRISTOPHER CATALDO* 
Abstract: On April 15, 2016, the Iowa Supreme Court held that employers in 
workers’ compensation cases could deny liability for medical expenses incurred 
by employees even if they did not give notice to the employee that expenses were 
no longer authorized. Employers can avoid liability by demonstrating that the 
employee knew or reasonably should have known that such expenses were no 
longer authorized at the time the employee incurred them. In reaching this deci-
sion, the Iowa Supreme Court reversed two lower court decisions and the work-
ers’ compensation commissioner. Judge Daryl L. Hecht’s dissent argued against 
the majority’s new “employee knowledge” standard, reasoning that it is incom-
patible with the clear language of the worker’ compensation statute and would 
therefore create confusion and uncertainty in workers’ compensation cases by up-
setting the balance of interests between employers and employees that the legis-
lature set. This Comment argues in favor of the dissent’s proposed approach be-
cause the employee knowledge standard increases the already substantial ad-
vantages employers enjoy over employees in workers’ compensation cases and is 
fundamentally unfair towards Iowa workers, the principal population the statute 
was designed to protect and benefit. 
INTRODUCTION 
On August 1, 2009, Deanna Ramirez-Trujillo slipped on an egg on the 
floor at her workplace in Clarion, Iowa and injured her back, triggering a peri-
od of chronic pain that lasted more than two years and ultimately cumulated in 
surgery for a herniated disk.1 After Ms. Ramirez-Trujillo’s slip, her employer, 
Quality Egg, L.L.C. (“Quality Egg”), acknowledged her injury and authorized 
her to receive treatment pursuant to Iowa Code § 85.27.2 Quality Egg author-
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 1 Ramirez-Trujillo v. Quality Egg, L.L.C. (Ramirez-Trujillo III), 878 N.W.2d 759, 764, 765, 766 
(Iowa 2016). 
 2 See id. at 764. Section 85.27, as part of the larger workers’ compensation provisions of Chapter 
85, outlines the rights and duties of employers in workers’ compensation claims. IOWA CODE § 85.27 
(2007). The code requires employers to pay the medical expenses of injured employers, but allows the 
employer to select the care provider. See id. § 85.27(4). 
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ized and reimbursed care for Ms. Ramirez-Trujillo from the time of her slip 
through September 2009.3 From May 2010 through April 2011, she sought 
additional treatment for injuries to her back, including multiple surgeries.4 On 
October 13, 2010, Ms. Ramirez-Trujillo filed a petition with the workers’ 
compensation commissioner seeking workers’ compensation benefits, penalty 
benefits, and reimbursement for the medical expenses she incurred from May 
2010 through April 2011.5 Quality Egg stipulated that it authorized her initial 
medical expenses, but argued it did not authorize expenses incurred during the 
latter period.6 
The deputy workers’ compensation commissioner issued an arbitration 
decision in favor of Quality Egg, finding that Ms. Ramirez-Trujillo’s condition 
after September 30, 2009 was not the result of her August 2009 workplace in-
jury and therefore her employer was not liable for any medical expenses in-
curred after September 30, 2009.7 Ms. Ramirez-Trujillo appealed to the work-
ers’ compensation commissioner, who affirmed the factual findings of the arbi-
tration decision.8 However, the commissioner awarded Ms. Ramirez-Trujillo 
the reimbursement for medical expenses for the disputed period because Quali-
ty Egg failed to notify her it was not authorizing further treatment.9 The com-
missioner based this decision on Iowa Code section 85.27(4) (“Section 
85.27(4)”), which requires employers to reimburse medical expenses until they 
provide notice to the employee that they no longer authorize them.10 
                                                                                                                           
 3 Ramirez-Trujillo III, 878 N.W.2d at 766; see Brief of Appellees at 40, Ramirez-Trujillo III, 878 
N.W.2d 759 (Iowa 2016) (No. 14-0640), 2014 WL 11512938, at *40. 
 4 Ramirez-Trujillo III, 878 N.W.2d at 765, 766. On August 4, 2010, Ms. Ramirez-Trujillo under-
went a decompression surgery performed by Dr. Mark Palit to repair a protruding disk along her lum-
bar spine, followed by an additional revision on March 23, 2011. Id. at 765–66. 
 5 Id. at 766. Ms. Ramirez-Trujillo petitioned for medical expenses “[to the present] and running.” 
Appellant’s Brief and Argument, Ramirez-Trujillo III, 878 N.W.2d 759 (Iowa 2016) (No. 14-0640), 
2014 WL 11512939, at *7. Injured workers are entitled under the statute to receive weekly compensa-
tion benefits based on their usual earnings; if an employer fails to provide these benefits the workers’ 
compensation commissioner has the authority to impose additional payments as a penalty. See IOWA 
CODE § 86.13. 
 6 Ramirez-Trujillo III, 878 N.W.2d at 766. Quality Egg accepted liability for and paid Ms. 
Ramirez-Trujillo’s medical expenses from August 2009 through September 30, 2009. Id. 
 7 Id. at 767. The first stage of the process for an injured employee to challenge an employer’s 
failure to provide benefits is an administrative hearing presided by a deputy workers’ compensation 
commissioner. See IOWA CODE § 86.17. 
 8 Ramirez-Trujillo III, 878 N.W.2d at 767. 
 9 Id. 
 10 Id. The statutory language at issue is as follows: 
For purposes of this section, the employer is obliged to furnish reasonable services and 
supplies to treat an injured employee, and has the right to choose the care. If the em-
ployer chooses the care, the employer shall hold the employee harmless for the cost of 
care until the employer notifies the employee that the employer is no longer authorizing 
all or any part of the care and the reason for the change in authorization. 
IOWA CODE § 85.27(4) (2007). 
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Quality Egg then sought judicial review, where the district court affirmed 
the commissioner’s decision regarding the non-causal relationship to her work 
injury, but also found the commissioner erred in interpreting Section 
85.27(4).11 As such, the district court held that Quality Egg was not liable for 
expenses incurred after September 30, 2009.12 Ms. Ramirez-Trujillo appealed 
the decision to the Court of Appeals, which upheld the commissioner’s factual 
findings but reversed the district court’s interpretation of Section 85.27(4), 
holding that the language of the statute requires an employer to give the em-
ployee notice that medical expenses were no longer authorized.13 Because 
Quality Egg did not provide Ms. Ramirez-Trujillo such notice, it was liable for 
the medical expenses.14 Both parties sought further review from the Iowa Su-
preme Court.15 
The Iowa Supreme Court, on April 15, 2016, affirmed in part, reversed in 
part, and remanded the case with instructions.16 The only issue the court chose 
to review was the proper interpretation of Section 85.27(4).17 The court held 
that an employer may prove it is not liable for the cost of medical care by 
demonstrating that it gave the employee actual notice of a change in authoriza-
tion or by demonstrating an employee knew or reasonably should have known 
either that the care received was unrelated to the condition for which the care 
was originally authorized or that the employer no longer authorized the care 
the employee received.18 The dissent would not have allowed for the latter 
“employee knowledge” standard, arguing that it conflicted with the clear lan-
guage of the statute, created uncertainty and confusion in workers’ compensa-
tion cases, and upset the balance between the rights of employees and employ-
ers set by the legislature.19 
Part I of this Comment summarizes the factual and procedural history of 
Ramirez-Trujillo. Part II discusses the majority’s decision to create a new 
standard by which employers can avoid liability for authorized medical ex-
penses. Finally, Part III agrees with the dissent that the majority’s standard is 
                                                                                                                           
 11 Ramirez-Trujillo III, 878 N.W.2d at 767–68. 
 12 Id.; Ramirez-Trujillo v. Quality Egg, L.L.C. (Ramirez-Trujillo I), No. CV045886, at 18 (Iowa 
Dist. Ct. for Polk Cnty. Dec. 31 2013), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 2015 WL 576130 (Iowa Ct. App. 
Feb. 11, 2015), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 878 N.W.2d 759 (Iowa 2016). 
 13 Ramirez-Trujillo v. Quality Egg, L.L.C. (Ramirez-Trujillo II), No. 14-0640, 2015 WL 576130, 
at *3,*5, *6 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 11, 2015) (ruling district court erred in interpreting section 85.27(4)), 
aff’d in part, vacated in part, 878 N.W.2d 759 (Iowa 2016). 
 14 See id. 
 15 Ramirez-Trujillo III, 878 N.W.2d at 768. 
 16 Id. at 779. The court remanded the case to the district court with instructions to remand the case 
to the workers’ compensation commissioner for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. Id. 
 17 Id. at 768. The Iowa Supreme Court retains discretion as to what issues it chooses to review on 
appeal. See id.; Gits Mfg. Co v. Frank, 855 N.W.2d 195, 197 (Iowa 2014). 
 18 Ramirez-Trujillo III, 878 N.W.2d at 778. 
 19 Id. at 781, 782, 783. 
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inappropriate as it contradicts established statutory language, upsets the bal-
ance of protected interests in favor of employers, and is unfair towards the crit-
ical population the statute is designed to protect—workers. 
I. FROM THE EGG ON THE FLOOR TO THE IOWA SUPREME COURT 
On August 1, 2009, Deanna Ramirez-Trujillo slipped on an egg on the 
floor at her workplace at Quality Egg, L.L.C in Clarion Iowa and injured her 
back.20 Quality Egg acknowledged the injury and authorized her to receive 
care at the Wright Medical Center, a nearby medical facility.21 Between August 
and September of 2009, Ms. Ramirez-Trujillo received prescription medica-
tions, transcutaneous electrical nerve stimulation, and physical therapy to treat 
her injury.22 At each of her appointments with a physician assistant, Ms. 
Ramirez-Trujillo signed an authorization form to release her medical records to 
Quality Egg and its insurer.23 On September 30, 2009, a physician assistant at 
Wright Medical Center released Ms. Ramirez-Trujillo to full duty without any 
work restrictions, indicating that her back strain was resolving and that she 
required no follow-up care.24 
Unfortunately, Ms. Ramirez-Trujillo’s back problems did not resolve and 
throughout the next several months she returned to Wright Medical Center 
multiple times seeking additional treatment.25 In June 2010, an x-ray of Ms. 
Ramirez-Trujillo’s lumbar spine showed disc space narrowing at L5-S1, a disk 
located in her lower back.26 The doctor’s notes indicated that Ms. Ramirez-
Trujillo expressly stated “this is not workman’s comp.”27 At a follow up ap-
                                                                                                                           
 20 Ramirez-Trujillo v. Quality Egg, L.L.C. (Ramirez-Trujillo III), 878 N.W.2d 759, 764, 765, 766 
(Iowa 2016). Ms. Ramirez-Trujillo caught herself before falling to the floor, but nevertheless injured 
her back. Id. 
 21 Id. 
 22 Id. Transcutaneous Electrical Nerve Stimulation is a method of pain management and physical 
therapy whereby a small electrical current is applied to an injured body part. See Transcutaneous Electri-
cal Nerve Stimulation (TENS)—Topic Overview, WEBMD, http://www.webmd.com/pain-management/
tc/transcutaneous-electrical-nerve-stimulation-tens-topic-overview [https://perma.cc/PV6E-NTDU]. 
 23 Ramirez-Trujillo III, 878 N.W.2d at 764. Ms. Ramirez-Trujillo did not receive or sign authori-
zation forms at her physical therapy appointments. Id. Employees are required by law to release in-
formation about their medical treatment to their employers. IOWA CODE § 85.27(2) (2007). 
 24 Ramirez-Trujillo III, 878 N.W.2d at 764. 
 25 See id. at 764, 765. On December 26, 2009, Ms. Ramirez-Trujillo sought treatment for lower 
back pain at Wright Medical Center; she received an injection and prescriptions for several medica-
tions before returning to work on December 29. Id. at 764. On May 1, 2010, Ms. Ramirez-Trujillo 
again received care at the Wright Medical Center for her lower back pain, receiving injections and 
prescriptions for several medications. Id. at 765. Throughout the next several weeks, Ms. Ramirez-
Trujillo continued to receive follow-up care from a physician assistant and a doctor, and she began 
physical therapy. Id. 
 26 Id. Upon evaluating the x-ray and MRI, Dr. Palit diagnosed Ms. Ramirez-Trujillo with a herni-
ated disk. Brief of Appellees, supra note 3, at 17. 
 27 Ramirez-Trujillo III, 878 N.W.2d at 765. 
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pointment Dr. Mark Palit, a surgeon, gave a steroid injection.28 Dr. Palit’s notes 
explained that Ms. Ramirez-Trujillo said her August 2009 slip injury had re-
solved with conservative care.29 On August 4, 2010, Dr. Palit performed de-
compression surgery to address Ms. Ramirez-Trujillo’s herniated disk.30 
Ms. Ramirez-Trujillo filed a notice and petition with the workers’ com-
pensation commissioner against her employer and its insurer on October 13, 
2010 seeking workers’ compensation benefits, penalty benefits, and medical 
expenses that she incurred from May 2010 through April 2011.31 Quality Egg 
stipulated that Ms. Ramirez-Trujillo sustained an injury during the course of 
her employment on August 1, 2009 and that it authorized treatment and medi-
cal expenses through September 30, 2009.32 Quality Egg argued that it did not 
authorize the expenses incurred between May 2010 and April 2011, and it fur-
ther stated that said expenses did not have a causal connection to her work-
place injury.33 
At an arbitration hearing, both Ms. Ramirez-Trujillo and Quality Egg pre-
sented expert testimony from medical experts and lay persons as to the causal 
link, or lack thereof, between Ms. Ramirez-Trujillo’s August 2009 slip and the 
medical expenses she incurred between May 2010 and April 2011.34 After the 
hearing, Deputy Workers’ Compensation Commissioner Michelle McGovern 
issued an arbitration decision in favor of Quality Egg, finding that Ms. 
Ramirez-Trujillo’s condition after September 30, 2009 was not causally related 
to her August 2009 work injury and therefore Quality Egg was not liable for 
the medical expenses she incurred from May 2010 through April 2011.35 Ms. 
Ramirez-Trujillo subsequently appealed to the workers’ compensation com-
missioner, who affirmed the arbitration decision that there was no causal link 
between the August 2009 workplace injury and the expenses incurred after 
                                                                                                                           
 28 Id. 
 29 Id. 
 30 Id. On March 23, 2011, Dr. Palit performed a revision of the decompression surgery after Ms. 
Ramirez-Trujillo indicated she was still experiencing severe pain. Id. at 765–66; Brief of Appellees, 
supra note 3, at 17. 
 31 Ramirez-Trujillo III, 878 N.W.2d at 766. Ms. Ramirez-Trujillo did not seek reimbursement for 
the expenses incurred during December 2009. Id. at 766 n.2. 
 32 Id. at 766; see Brief of Appellees, supra note 3, at 39–40. 
 33 Ramirez-Trujillo III, 878 N.W.2d at 766; Brief of Appellees, supra note 3, at 39–40. 
 34 Ramirez-Trujillo III, 878 N.W.2d at 766. Ms. Ramirez-Trujillo submitted a written evaluation 
and report prepared by Dr. Robin Epp, a certified independent medical examiner, who concluded that 
Ms. Ramirez-Trujillo’s condition and treatment after September 30, 2009, was causally related to her 
August 2009 workplace injury. Id. Ms. Ramirez-Trujillo’s and other testimony by lay witnesses sup-
ported Dr. Epp’s opinion. Id. Quality Egg submitted a written medical opinion prepared by Dr. Donna 
Bahls, who concluded that Ms. Ramirez-Trujillo’s workplace injury did not contribute to her condi-
tion after September 30, 2009. Id. Quality Egg also introduced testimony of two employees who testi-
fied hearing Ms. Ramirez-Trujillo state she had slipped or fallen on some stairs at home. Id. at 767. 
 35 Id.; Brief of Appellees, supra note 3, at 5. 
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September 30, 2009.36 The commissioner nonetheless awarded Ms. Ramirez-
Trujillo the expenses incurred from May 2010 through April 2011 because 
Quality Egg failed to notify her it was not authorizing further treatment.37 The 
commissioner interpreted Section 85.27(4) to require an employer to cover the 
cost of authorized care unless the provider notifies the employee that care is no 
longer authorized.38 
Quality Egg sought judicial review in the Iowa District Court for Polk 
County of the commissioner’s ruling that it must reimburse Ms. Ramirez-
Trujillo for medical expenses that she incurred from May 2010 through April 
2011.39 Judge Scott D. Rosenberg affirmed the factual findings of the agency 
as to the lack of a causal link between the August 2009 workplace injury and 
the post-September 2009 medical expenses, but also found that the commis-
sioner erroneously interpreted Section 85.27(4).40 Judge Rosenberg found that 
Quality Egg reasonably believed Ms. Ramirez-Trujillo recovered from her 
workplace injury and the company did not receive notice that she was seeking 
further care.41 Therefore, the court determined Quality Egg was not liable for 
the medical expenses Ms. Ramirez-Trujillo incurred after September 30, 
2009.42 
Ms. Ramirez-Trujillo appealed the district court’s judgment to the Iowa 
Court of Appeals.43 The court of appeals upheld the portion of the district court 
judgment affirming the factual findings of the commissioner, but found the 
district court erroneously interpreted Section 85.27(4).44 The court of appeals 
held that the statutory language required an employer to provide notice to an 
employee that care was no longer authorized, and because Quality Egg did not 
do so, it was liable for Ms. Ramirez-Trujillo’s expenses.45 Both Quality Egg 
                                                                                                                           
 36 Ramirez-Trujillo III, 878 N.W.2d at 767. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id.; Brief of Appellees, supra note 3, at 49. “Ramirez-Trujillo asserted the agency erred in 
failing to comply with Iowa Code section 17A.16(1) and in applying legal standards on the issue of 
causation.” Ramirez-Trujillo III, 878 N.W.2d at 768; see also Brief of Appellees, supra note 3, at 20 
(explaining Ramirez-Trujillo’s argument). The district court rejected both these arguments. See 
Ramirez-Trujillo III, 878 N.W.2d at 768. 
 40 See Ramirex-Trujillo v. Quality Egg, L.L.C. (Ramirez-Trujillo I), No. CV045886, at 15, 17 
(Iowa Dist. Ct. for Polk Cnty. Dec. 31, 2013) aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 2015 WL 576130 (Iowa Ct. 
App. Feb. 11, 2015), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 878 N.W.2d 759 (Iowa 2016). 
 41 Id. at 17, 18. 
 42 Id. at 18. 
 43 Ramirez-Trujillo III, 878 N.W.2d at 768. 
 44 Id.; Ramirez-Trujillo v. Quality Egg, L.L.C. (Ramirez-Trujillo II), No. 14-0640, 2015 WL 
576130, at *5, *6 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 11, 2015) (ruling district court erred interpreting section 
85.27(4)), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 878 N.W.2d 759 (Iowa 2016). 
 45 Ramirez-Trujillo II, 2015 WL 576130, at *5, *6. 
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and Ms. Ramirez-Trujillo sought further review from the Iowa Supreme 
Court.46 
The Iowa Supreme Court upheld the judgments of the lower courts’ de-
termination as to the lack of a causal link between Ms. Ramirez-Trujillo’s Au-
gust 2009 workplace injury and her condition after September 30, 2009.47 The 
court reversed the holdings of the court of appeals and the district court as to 
the interpretation of Section 85.27(4).48 The court held that Section 85.27(4) 
requires employers to hold employees harmless for authorized medical ex-
penses up to the time when the employer notifies the employee that it is no 
longer authorizing care.49 The court held, however, that an employer could 
avoid liability for an employee’s medical expenses by proving by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that “the employee knew or reasonably should have 
known that either the care was unrelated to the medical condition which the 
claim for workers’ compensation benefits was based or that the employer no 
longer authorized the care the employee received at the time the employee re-
ceived it.”50 Accordingly, the court remanded the case to the district court with 
instructions to remand the case to the commissioner for further proceedings 
consistent with the judgment.51 
In his dissent, Judge Daryl L. Hecht opposed the creation of the “employ-
ee knowledge” standard, and argued that employers should not be able to avoid 
liability for these types of expenses unless they provided actual notice to the 
employee that benefits were no longer authorized.52 Judge Hecht reasoned the 
standard was inconsistent with the clear and unambiguous statutory language 
in Section 85.27(4), and was concerned that the majority’s ruling would create 
confusion in workers’ compensation cases and an influx of litigation.53 Fur-
thermore, the dissent argued that the majority’s ruling upset the balance be-
tween employers and employees carefully set by the legislature.54 
                                                                                                                           
 46 Ramirez-Trujillo III, 878 N.W.2d at 768. Ms. Ramirez-Trujillo argued that the district court 
and the workers’ compensation commissioner mistakenly concluded that there was not a causal link 
between the workplace injury and her condition after September 30, 2009. See Appellant’s Brief and 
Argument, supra note 5, at *47–48. 
 47 See Ramirez-Trujillo III, 878 N.W.2d at 779. 
 48 See id. 
 49 Id. at 771–72. 
 50 Id. at 777. 
 51 Id. at 779. 
 52 See id. at 783 (Hecht, J., dissenting). 
 53 Id. at 781, 782. 783. 
 54 Id. at 783. 
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II. THE IOWA SUPREME COURT’S CREATION OF THE EMPLOYEE 
KNOWLEDGE STANDARD TO AVOID LIABILITY IN  
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION CLAIMS 
In Ramirez-Trujillo III, the Iowa Supreme Court reversed portions of the 
decisions of lower courts and the workers’ compensation commissioner inter-
preting Section 85.27(4).55 The majority held that employers could avoid lia-
bility of medical expenses incurred by an employee seeking treatment for a 
workplace injury, despite the employer’s failure to provide the employee actual 
notice that care was no longer authorized, if it could demonstrate that the em-
ployee knew or reasonably should have known that the employer no longer 
authorized the care at the time the employee received it.56 The court developed 
this new “employee knowledge” standard because it did not want employees to 
be able to take advantage of an employer by seeking compensation for expens-
es incurred when they knew or reasonably should have known the prior author-
ization was no longer in effect.57 
In his dissent, Judge Daryl L. Hecht opposed the development of the 
“employee knowledge” standard.58 He argued that the majority’s standard con-
tradict the clear language of the statute, created the potential for increased liti-
gation and confusion in workers’ compensation cases, and upset the balance of 
interests between employers and employees fastened by the legislature.59 
Judge Hecht would allow employers to avoid liability for expenses only if they 
provided actual notice to the employee that benefits were no longer author-
ized.60 
A. The Majority’s Construction of an Employee Knowledge Standard 
Before examining Section 85.27(4) and its application to the case at hand, 
the Iowa Supreme Court first considered whether it could provide its own 
judgment as to the proper interpretation of Section 85.27(4) or if it had to defer 
to the workers’ compensation commissioner.61 Finding that the legislature did 
not intend to delegate authority to interpret Section 85.27(4) to the workers’ 
compensation commissioner, the court concluded that it could substitute its 
own judgment as the proper interpretation.62 The court’s conclusion that it 
                                                                                                                           
 55 Ramirez-Trujillo v. Quality Egg, L.L.C. (Ramirez-Trujillo III), 878 N.W.2d 759, 779 (Iowa 
2016). 
 56 Id. at 778. 
 57 Id. at 776. 
 58 See id. at 780 (Hecht, J., dissenting). 
 59 Id. at 781–83. 
 60 Id. at 783. 
 61 See id. at 768, 769 (majority opinion). 
 62 Id. at 770. Courts will only defer to an agency interpretation if they are firmly convinced that 
the legislature actually intended to delegate interpretative power to the agency. Id. at 769. Given that 
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could use its own judgment in interpreting Section 85.27(4) provided the legal 
basis for creating the “employee knowledge” standard—something not found 
in the express language of the statute or in the court’s previous workers’ com-
pensation case law.63 
The court found that the primary purpose of the workers’ compensation 
statute is to benefit the worker.64 Although the workers’ compensation statute 
is construed in favor of the employee, the legislature carefully balanced the 
interests of both employees and employers.65 If an employer accepts liability 
for an employee’s injury and reimburses the employee’s medical expenses, 
under the statute the employer retains a limited right to choose who provides 
the medical care.66 The notion of the workers’ compensation statute balancing 
the interests of employers and employee strongly factored into the court’s rea-
soning as it interpreted the statute.67 
The proper interpretation of the second sentence of Section 85.27(4) was 
the key issue before the court and provided the basis for the creation of the 
“employee knowledge” standard.68 The court concluded the first part of the 
sentence requires employers to hold employees harmless for authorized medi-
cal expenses.69 The court then found that the statute requires employers to pay 
for the medical care until it notifies the employee that it is no longer authoriz-
ing care.70 Accordingly, an employer can avoid liability for expenses by show-
ing it gave the employee actual notice that care was no longer authorized.71 In 
explaining its interpretation of Section 85.27(4), the court emphasized that the 
statute limited employer liability to medical expenses related to the condition 
                                                                                                                           
the statutory language did not expressly grant the commissioner the power to interpret section 
85.27(4), and given the lack of any substantive terms uniquely within the interpretative expertise of 
the commissioner, the court was not firmly convinced the legislature intend to delegate authority to 
interpret the section. Id. at 770. 
 63 See id. 
 64 Id. The court referred to section 85.27(4) as well the entire workers’ compensation statue con-
tained in chapter 85. Id. The Iowa Supreme Court has held that the primary purpose of chapter 85 is to 
benefit the worker and thus the law is interpreted liberally in favor of the employee. Id.; see also Grif-
fin Pipe Prods. Co. v. Guarino, 663 N.W.2d 862, 865 (Iowa 2003) (“With respect to the workers’ 
compensation statute in particular, we keep in mind that the primary purpose of chapter 85 is to bene-
fit the worker and so we interpret this law liberally in favor of the employee.”). Furthermore, the stat-
ute seeks to resolve workplace-injury claims efficiently and with minimal litigation. Ramirez-Trujillo 
III, 878 N.W.2d at 770. 
 65 See Ramirez-Trujillo III, 878 N.W.2d at 770–71. 
 66 Id. at 771. Explaining the employers’ right to choose care, the statute reads “[i]f the employer 
chooses the care, the employer shall hold the employee harmless for the cost of care until the employ-
er notifies the employee that the employer is no longer authorizing all or any part of the care and the 
reason for the change in authorization.” IOWA CODE § 85.27(4) (2007). 
 67 See Ramirez-Trujillo III, 878 N.W.2d at 771. 
 68 See id. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. at 772. 
 71 Id. at 777. 
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upon which the claim for workers’ compensation was based, stressing that al-
lowing an employer to be liable for any medical expenses incurred by an em-
ployee at an authorized medical provider “would lead to absurd results.”72 
These conclusions provided the reasoning from which the court inferred the 
“employee knowledge” standard.73 
The “employee knowledge” standard created a new way for employers to 
avoid liability even if they did not provide actual notice as required by the 
statute.74 Reasoning that employees should not be able to “take advantage of 
an employer,” the court held that it “simply [did] not believe” Section 85.27(4) 
affirmatively requires employers to give notice they are no longer authorizing 
care when the employee knew or reasonably should have known the care was 
no longer authorized.75 The court was concerned about the possibility of an 
employee being able to go to their authorized medical provider and get reim-
bursed for medical care that the employer would not have expected to pay ei-
ther because of a belief that the condition had resolved or because the care was 
for an unrelated condition.76 Therefore, the court concluded that an employer 
can also avoid liability if it proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
employee knew or reasonably should have known that the employer no longer 
authorized care at the time the employee received it.77 
Underlying the court’s reasoning was the notion that employer liability 
for an employee’s medical expenses is not unlimited and that there are some 
situations where fairness requires releasing them from their obligations to cov-
er the costs of medical care.78 The court explained that it would be absurd to 
require employers to be responsible for expenses incurred at authorized medi-
cal providers for conditions unrelated to the underlying compensation claim.79 
Likewise, the “employee knowledge” standard would protect employers from 
paying where the employee knew that the care was no longer authorized.80 
Such rules seek to ensure that the balance of interests set by the legislature 
does not unfairly shift in favor of employees.81 
                                                                                                                           
 72 Id. at 775. 
 73 See id. 
 74 See id. at 778. 
 75 Id. at 776–77. 
 76 See id. 
 77 Id. at 777. The court also held an employer could avoid liability if it could prove by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that the employee knew or reasonably should have known the care the em-
ployee received was unrelated to the medical condition upon which the claim for workers’ compensa-
tion was based. Id. 
 78 See id. at 776. 
 79 Id. at 775. 
 80 Id. at 777. 
 81 See id. at 776. 
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B. The Dissent’s Warning of Unfair Employer Advantages 
In his dissent, Judge Daryl L. Hecht disagreed with the majority’s devel-
opment of the “employee knowledge” standard to allow employers to avoid 
liability despite their failure to provide employees with actual notice that they 
no longer authorized care.82 Judge Hecht reasoned that the “employee 
knowledge” standard was inconsistent with the clear language of the statute.83 
He disagreed with the majority that the language of Section 85.27(4) was am-
biguous, and thus believed it was unnecessary to search for legislative intent or 
meaning beyond the express terms of the statute.84 According to Judge Hecht, 
under the clear meaning of the statute, the employer’s authorization of care 
continues until the employer gives the employee actual notice of a change.85 
In addition to its incompatibility with the statutory language, the “em-
ployee knowledge” standard, according to Judge Hecht, is problematic because 
it creates uncertainty and confusion in workers’ compensation cases and will 
inevitably generate more litigation.86 He argued that because the majority’s 
new, malleable standard replaces the bright line rule of notice with a fact-based 
inquiry, employers will be motivated to litigate more frequently when care is 
disputed.87 Consequently, workers’ compensation proceedings will become 
slower, more expensive, and less predictable, as parties argue over complex 
fact-based standards.88 
Furthermore, the dissent objected to the majority’s new standard because 
it upset the balance of interests between employers and employees set by the 
legislature.89 Judge Hecht argued that Section 85.27(4) already provided an 
employer with the ability to avoid liability by simply giving notice that care 
was no longer authorized.90 Because employers already control who provides 
care to the employee and have access to all of the related medical records, 
Judge Hecht argued they are well situated and readily able to give notice of a 
change in authorization without an “employee knowledge” standard.91 For 
Judge Hecht, employers are well equipped to determine if and when authoriza-
tion should no longer continue, and can easily notify employees of their deter-
minations.92 
                                                                                                                           
 82 See id. at 780 (Hecht, J., dissenting). 
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28 Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice [Vol. 37:E. Supp. 
III. THE UNFAIR ADVANTAGE THE EMPLOYEE KNOWLEDGE  
STANDARD GIVES EMPLOYERS 
The majority’s creation of the “employee knowledge” standard circum-
scribes the rights of injured employees standing to benefit from workers’ com-
pensation.93 This new standard allows employers to avoid liability by demon-
strating an employee knew or should have known that care was no longer au-
thorized without having to provide actual notice, increasing the already sub-
stantial advantages employers enjoy over employees in workers’ compensation 
cases and thereby upsetting the balance of interests set by the legislature.94 
Although the majority’s decision is problematic for all Iowa workers, it is es-
pecially troublesome for low-income, immigrant, and minority workers, be-
cause it adds yet another obstacle to the already substantial challenges they 
face in workers’ compensation cases.95 Accordingly, both the purpose of the 
workers’ compensation statute and the interests of Iowa workers are better 
served by Judge Hecht’s approach.96 
Rather than furthering the primary purpose of the workers’ compensation 
statute, the “employee knowledge” standard adds to the already extensive list 
of advantages employers enjoy over injured employees in workers’ compensa-
tion cases.97 The majority’s “employee knowledge” standard upsets this bal-
ance by shifting even more control over the process to the employer.98 Prior to 
the standard, an employer seeking to avoid liability for medical expenses did 
not face an onerous burden—they simply had to provide notice to the employ-
                                                                                                                           
 93 See Ramirez-Trujillo v. Quality Egg, L.L.C. (Ramirez-Trujillo III), 878 N.W.2d 759, 783 (Iowa 
2016) (Hecht, J., dissenting). 
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ployee’s medical care and treatment. See Ramirez-Trujillo III, 878 N.W.2d at 782. An “employee, 
employer or insurance carrier making or defending a claim for benefits agrees to the release of all 
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longer authorized. See Ramirez-Trujillo III, 878 N.W.2d at 783. These rights are balanced against 
employees’ rights to seek reimbursement for unauthorized care if it was reasonable and beneficial 
under the circumstances, or to seek alternative care if the authorized care was not offered promptly or 
was unduly inconvenient or not reasonably suited to treat the injury sustained. See id. at 773 (majority 
opinion). 
 95 See Ramirez-Trujillo III, 878 N.W.2d at 773; Allard E. Dembe, The Social Consequences of 
Occupational Injuries and Illnesses, 40 AM. J. INDUS. MED. 403, 412 (2001) (explaining that low-
income, immigrant, non-native speakers and other vulnerable populations in the workplace face higher 
rates of denied workers’ compensation claims and less access to medical care). 
 96 See Ramirez-Trujillo III, 878 N.W.2d at 783 (Hecht, J., dissenting). 
 97 See id. at 783; supra note 94 and accompanying text. 
 98 See Ramirez-Trujillo III, 878 N.W.2d at 783. 
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ee that expenses were no longer authorized.99 The “employee knowledge” 
standard makes the already minimal burden for employers even easier, giving 
them a means of denying liability for medical expenses despite their failure to 
provide notice.100 
Moreover, the majority’s new standard contradicts its own reasoning.101 
The court held that “section 85.27(4) contains no language to suggest the legis-
lature intended to obligate employees to make sure care authorizations remain 
in force before accepting care” and explained that imposing an “obligation on 
employees to make sure the employer still authorizes care before accepting it 
would turn the statute on its head.”102 The “employee knowledge” standard, 
however, accomplishes the exact opposite of those objectives.103 Abandoning a 
bright-line rule in favor of a fact-based standard incentivizes more litigation 
and more time-consuming factual inquires.104 Holding employees accountable 
for what they should have known about the authorization of their care creates 
the precise obligation the court proclaimed the statute did not require.105 Fur-
thermore, creating a new opportunity for employers to escape liability in a way 
that conflicts with the statutory language certainly does not construe the statute 
to in favor of the worker as the majority itself purports its primary purpose to 
be.106 
More fundamentally, the “employee knowledge” standard’s focus on what 
the employee knew or reasonably should have known raises concerns about 
basic fairness.107 The facts of a given claim, the details of medical treatment, 
and the laws generally governing workers’ compensation are already suffi-
ciently complex as to require review by the Iowa Supreme Court.108 The ma-
jority acknowledges that employees are “ordinarily laypersons without the ex-
pertise necessary to make accurate determinations regarding medical causa-
tion.”109 It is unrealistic and incongruous to deny an employee’s claim for re-
imbursement on the basis of what they knew or should have known about 
whether their care is still authorized when the Court itself is skeptical of their 
ability to understand their situation.110 Employees simply are in a far weaker 
position than employers—who have access to medical records and undoubted-
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ly more experience dealing with workers’ compensation—to understand the 
implicated complex rights and duties.111 
Such concerns as to an employee’s ability to fully understand their rights 
and obligations are even more problematic for the non-native language speak-
ers, immigrants, and low-income workers who already face significant obsta-
cles in workers’ compensation claims.112 These vulnerable populations are al-
ready at a disadvantage understanding the English language, much less the in-
tricacies of workers’ compensation laws, yet the majority nevertheless holds 
them to an objective standard concerning what they should have known about 
their medical care.113 Holding these workers responsible for knowledge of the 
law is especially problematic given minorities often do not have access to legal 
representation.114 Furthermore, outside of the workers’ compensation setting, 
minorities already have less access to healthcare, and the care they do receive 
is lower quality.115 Workers’ compensation cases, where the health care costs 
are covered by the employer, offered some hope for minorities to receive better 
access to care, however the majority’s decision makes it even harder for those 
who face the most obstacles in workers’ compensation cases to get treatment 
for injuries they sustained on the job.116 
CONCLUSION 
The Iowa Supreme Court, in Ramirez-Trujillo v. Quality Egg, L.L.C., 
chose to articulate a new interpretation of the workers’ compensation statute 
contained in Section 85.27(4). Holding that the ambiguity of the statutory lan-
guage permitted the court to insert its own interpretation, the court created a 
new basis for employers to deny liability in workers’ compensation claims. 
The court ruled employers can avoid liability, despite their failure to provide 
notice as written in the statute, if they could show that an employee knew or 
reasonably should have known that the employer no longer authorized medical 
expenses. Rather than supporting the primary purpose of the statute—
benefiting the worker—the new “employee knowledge” standard increases the 
already substantial advantages employers enjoy over their employees. In a dis-
senting opinion, Judge Hecht contested the creation of the new standard, argu-
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ing it was inconsistent with the clear language of the statute, created confusion 
and uncertainty in workers’ compensation claims spawning litigation, and up-
set the balance of interests set by the legislature. Judge Hecht’s concerns were 
well-founded. The majority’s standard contradicts the court’s own reasoning, 
further empowers employers at the expense of employees, and raises serious 
concerns about basic fairness. It is especially problematic for workers from 
minority populations as it creates additional obstacles for those who are al-
ready disadvantaged and most vulnerable to exploitation. The majority was 
fearful of employees being able to exploit the workers’ compensation system 
and take advantage of their employers by receiving unauthorized medical care. 
The court’s fears were unfounded as employers already possessed a surefire 
means of preventing unauthorized care—notifying the employee that they were 
no longer authorizing it. The majority overlooked this protection found ex-
pressly in the statute, instead inventing a new standard to solve a problem that 
did not exist. More troubling than overlooking the statutory language, some-
how the Iowa Supreme Court managed to forget about the workers in workers’ 
compensation. 
